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THE LIMITS OF LEGAL LANGUAGE:
DECISIONMAKING IN CAPITAL CASES
Jordan M. Steiker*
INTRODUCTION

Few areas of constitutional adjudication have generated as much
doctrinal complexity in so little time as contemporary death penalty law.
Thirty years ago, federal constitutional rulings placed virtually no restraints on state death penalty practices apart from generic rulings that
applied to all state criminal proceedings. 1 At that time, the Supreme
Court had less to tell states about capital punishment than it routinely
told them about much more mundane matters of state civil and criminal
law. The Court had, for example, spoken much more clearly and directly to state efforts to terminate driver's licenses than to state efforts
to impose the ultimate punishment.2 Nor did Court intervention seem
particularly likely. As late as 1962, Alexander Bickel lamented that the
Court had "missed or·ha[d] willfully passed up its most signal opportunities" to address the constitutionality of capital punishment and that
"barring spectacular extraneous events, the moment of judgment" regarding the death penalty was "a generation or more away. " 3

* Cooper K. Ragin Regents Professor, University of Texas School of Law. B.A.
1984, Wesleyan; J.D. 1988, Harvard. - Ed. My thanks to Carol Steiker for her helpful
comments and suggestions. A version of this paper was delivered as a Clason lecture at
the Western College of Law in April, 1996.
1. See, for example, Hugo Bedau's observation, as late as 1968, that "not a single
death penalty statute, not a single statutorily imposed mode of execution, not a single
attempted execution has ever been held by any court to be 'cruel and unusual punishment' under any state or federal constitution." Hugo Adam Bedau, The Courts, the
Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201, 228-29.
2. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (holding that Georgia's statutory
scheme for suspending driver's licenses was constitutionally infirm insofar as it denied
the petitioner a hearing on the question whether there was a reasonable possibility of a
judgment being rendered against him as a result of his involvement in an accident).
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmcs 242 (1962). The "missed opportunities," in Bickel's
view, included the Court's decision upholding Louisiana's effort to electrocute a condemned man whom the state previously had attempted to electrocute without success,
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); its decisions permitting the
executions of inmates of questionable sanity without adequate procedural safeguards for
determining sanity, Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), and Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); its "acquiescence" in the proceedings that led to the exe2590

August 1996]

Capital Decisionmaking

2591

Bickel's prediction, of course, was way off the mark. Within ten
years of his assessment, opponents of capital punishment, buoyed by
the "revolution" in criminal procedure advanced by the Warren Court,
had successfully drawn the Court into the constitutional fray. The
NAACP Legal Defense Fund led the effort to halt executions through a
"moratorium" strategy by raising a myriad of procedural and substantive challenges to state death penalty schemes in cases in which "real"
execution dates loomed. 4 After their much heralded success in limiting
the practice of death-qualifying jurors in capital cases,5 the abolitionist
and reformist forces appeared to lose decisively when the Court upheld,
against due process challenge, "standardless discretion" in capital sentencing in McGautha v. California. 6 Indeed, immediately after McGautha was announced, Justice Brennan had become convinced "that it
was not just a lost skirmish, but rather the end of any hope that the
Court would hold capital punishment to be unconstitutional. " 7 He accordingly recommended that the Court decline review in all of the numerous death cases that had worked their way through the lower courts
and been held pending the Court's resolution of McGautha and other
potentially far-reaching capital cases.8
Political machinations on the Court, however, led to the grant of
certiorari in "clean cases" challenging the constitutionality of capital
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.9 Both the arguments of the
litigants and the ensuing opinions of the fractured Court reveal that

cution of the Rosenbergs, which Bickel likened to the French reign of terror, Rosenberg
v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953); and the Court's refusal to intervene in the Chessman case, despite Bickel's view that at the time of his execution, Chessman's crime was
arguably no longer capital, Chessman v. Teets, 362 U.S. 966 (1960), Chessman v. Dickson, 361 U.S. 955 (1960), and Chessman v. California, 361 U.S. 871 (1959).
4. See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PuN!SHMENT (1973) (describing the abolitionist efforts of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund in the years preceding Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
5. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (invalidating a death sentence obtained after the state was permitted to strike for cause all jurors who had conscientious
objections to capital punishment).
6. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
7. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A
View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 321 (1986).
8. Id. at 321-22. Adding to Bickel's list of "missed opportunities" were the
Court's decisions in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), which raised the McGautha issue of standardless discretion but which the Court ultimately decided on much
narrower Witherspoon grounds, and, more significantly, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969), which challenged the death penalty as "cruel and unusual" when imposed
for the crime of robbery but which the Court disposed of based on the inadequacy of
the petitioner's guilty plea.
9. Brennan, supra note 7, at 322.
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Furman v. Georgia 10 was not a piecemeal evaluation of particular aspects of state death penalty practices but rather an encompassing assessment of the moral, political, and practical dimensions of the American
system of capital punishment.
The five Justices who voted to strike down all of the capital statutes before the Court11 - and by implication, nearly all of the capital
statutes then in force 12 - wrote separate opinions identifying various
and, to some extent, conflicting rationales for the Court's judgment.
Notwithstanding their separate writings, the "majority" Justices did
share several fundamental criticisms of the status quo that revolved
around an acknowledged fact: despite the broad death eligibility established in most state schemes, relatively few persons were sentenced to
death and fewer still were executed in the decade before Furman. 13 The
rarity of death sentences and executions suggested that at least some of
those responsible for administering capital punishment - prosecutors,
judges, juries, and executive officials - lacked the will to impose a
widely available punishment. This gap led Justice Brennan to conclude
that the death penalty no longer enjoyed genuine support in the community and that its continued availability as a penalty was contrary to
"evolving standards of decency." 14 The paucity of executions in relation to broad death eligibility was troubling to other members of the
Court because there was simply no reliable evidence indicating that
those executed or sentenced to death were in any sense the most deserving of death among the death eligible. 15 Worse still, some members of
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11. In addition to deciding Furman, the Court reviewed three other cases: Jackson
v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, and Aikens v. California. See 403 U.S. 952 (1971) (granting certiorari).
12. Of the 40 state statutes in effect at the time of Furman, all but Rhode Island's
suffered from the defect of "standardless" discretion and were thus unenforceable in
light of the decision. Rhode Island's mandatory death penalty provisions were effectively struck down later when the Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires "individualized" sentencing in capital cases. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 282-305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating nondiscretionary death penalty
statute).
13. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The outstanding characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort to it."); 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408
U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
14. See 408 U.S. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); cf. 408 U.S.
at 362-64 (Marshall, J., concurring) (maintaining that fully informed citizens would
conclude that the death penalty is barbarously cruel).
15. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."); 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he death penalty is exacted with
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the Court, particularly Justice Douglas, feared that the few individuals
caught in the death penalty web were selected for discriminatory, morally irrelevant reasons, such as race or class. 16
These shared concerns about the alarming chasm between the
death penalty in theory and the death penalty in fact naturally led the
Court to condemn the absence of legislative guidance in state schemes.
Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's eloquent rejection of the petitioner's
claim in McGautha that the death penalty decision could be, and constitutionally must be, rationalized through detailed sentencing instructions, 17 the Furman Court seemed to suggest that just such guidance
was necessary to save the death penalty - if it could be saved18 - in
light of the apparent arbitrary and discriminatory aspects of prevailing
death penalty practices.
Legislative guidance presumably would ensure that individual sentencing decisions reflected the values of the larger community because
the state would announce in advance its "theory" of when death should
be imposed. 19 Such legislative guidance promised to address two distinct problems. First, clear standards would limit the risk that "undeserving" defendants would be sentenced to death because their particular juries concluded, contrary to the values of the community as a
whole, that the defendant before them was among the truly worst offenders. This problem of "overinclusion" was exacerbated in the preFurman era by the availability of the death penalty for crimes such as
rape and robbery, which, though undoubtedly very serious crimes, increasingly were regarded as meriting a lesser punishment than death by
the wider community.20
great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ... there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not").
16. 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the pre-Furman capital
statutes as "pregnant with discrimination" in their operation).
17. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) ("To identify before the
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the
death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond
present human ability.").
18. Many observers, both on and off the Court, believed that Furman was the end
of the death penalty in the United States. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (stating that "capital punishment . . . has for all practical purposes run its
course").
19. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 355, 365 (1995).
20. After Furman, the Justices who upheld the revised Georgia statute in Gregg v.
Georgia cited the Georgia Supreme Court's invalidation of the death penalty for armed
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Second, clear standards would ensure that all potentially "deserving" defendants would be subject to the same sentencing criteria rather
than the ad-hoc criteria adopted on a case-by-case basis by juries afforded absolute and unguided discretion. Legislative guidance thus held
out the possibility that like cases would be treated alike. Not only
would all undeserving defendants escape the death penalty; the hope
was that clear legislative direction would ensure that all deserving defendants received it as well.
States responded to Furman's critique of standardless discretion in
roughly two ways. Some states appeared to read Furman as requiring
the removal of sentencing discretion altogether and accordingly enacted
mandatory statutes that required and not merely permitted the death
penalty for certain offenses.21 Most states, however, revamped their statutes to increase substantially the structure of the sentencing decision
while at the same time preserving some sentencer discretion to choose
between life and death. 22 In these states, the previously broad injunctions to jurors to decide punishment in accordance with their " 'most
profound judgment' " 23 or their "dictates of conscience" 24 were replaced with formulas involving consideration of "aggravating" and
"mitigating" factors or "special issues." These latter statutes have
emerged as the sole constitutionally permissible vehicles for deciding
punishment in capital cases. Having invalidated the poles of standardless discretion and discretionless standards, the Court has directed
most of its regulatory efforts in the death penalty area to fine-tuning the
permissible middle ground of "guided discretion."
The resulting death penalty law has proven to be disastrous. As I
have argued elsewhere, by focusing so single-mindedly on state efforts
robbery as evidence of the state's progress in rationalizing the death penalty. See Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205-06 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
428 U.S. at 224 (White, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment). The Court ultimately relied on widespread consensus that the death penalty
was disproportionate for the crime of rape in striking down Georgia's provision for such
punishment a year later in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
21. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (reviewing Louisiana's
mandatory statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (reviewing North
Carolina's mandatory statute).
22. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (reviewing Florida's postFurman approach); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reviewing Georgia's postFurman approach).
23. This was the standard instruction given in Ohio and challenged in Crampton v.
Ohio, the companion case to McGautha. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 290
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Caldwell, 21 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ohio
1939)).
24. Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879 (1962).
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to refine sentencer discretion at the moment of decision, the Court has
rejected or ignored several more promising means of addressing arbitrary and discriminatory death penalty practices.25 It should be clear today if it was not in 1972 that quality representation, meaningful proportionality review of death verdicts, and adequate opportunities for federal
review of federal claims are essential to protect against undeserved and
unequal applications of the death penalty.
The problem with the current statutory embodiments of "guided
discretion," however, is not simply that they do not go far enough toward curing the ills identified in Furman. More fundamentally, contemporary death penalty instructions actually undermine the goals they purport to advance. "Guidance" in the post-Furman statutes often comes
in the form of mind-numbing details about the state's and the defendant's respective burdens of proof in establishing or disproving the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. 26 Such instructions, along
with highly technical directions about how to reach the ultimate verdict,27 are neither easily understood nor particularly helpful in rationalizing the death penalty decision. As recent empirical work has demon25. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 414-26 (describing regulatory possibilities apart from controlling sentencer discretion at the moment of decision).
26. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(g) (1994) ("When the factual existence of
an offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the defendant shall have the burden of
interjecting the issue, but once it is interjected the state shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(c)(iii) (1982) (requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for aggravating circumstances and proof by a preponderance of the evidence for mitigating circumstances); NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES§ 150.10, at 27 (1995) ("The existence of any mitigating
circumstance must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, the evidence, taken as a whole must satisfy you - not beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply
satisfy you - that any mitigating circumstance exists. . . . A juror may find that any
mitigating circumstance exists by a preponderance of the evidence whether or not that
circumstance was found to exist by all the jurors.").
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(2)(a)-(c) (Harrison 1991) ("After
hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the
court, based upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated ... ; (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) Based on these
considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or
death."); TENN. COOE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)-(g)(l)(B) (1991) ("(f) If the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the
state beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory
aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the
state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence
shall be life imprisonment.... (g)(l) If the jury unanimously determines that: (A) At
least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and (B) Such circum-
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strated,28 the complexity of current instructions is likely to steer
sentencers away from the core issues they are expected to decide.
Perhaps more importantly, the net effect of casting the death penalty decision in complicated, math-laden vocabulary is to obscure for
many jurors the fact that they do retain the ultimate moral decisionmaking power over who lives and dies. Guided discretion, as it appears in
contemporary statutes, can easily and wrongly be experienced as no discretion at all because such statutes invariably fail to instruct jurors in
affirmative terms about the scope of their moral authority and obligation. Thus, despite the Court's insistence that capital sentencers must be
permitted to return a life sentence based on particular mitigating aspects
of the defendant's character, background, or crime,29 state schemes
often push jurors toward the death penalty in cases in which individual
jurors may not believe that death is deserved. As one commentator has
aptly framed the problem, "giv[ing] a 'little' guidance to a death penalty jury" poses the risk that "jurors [will] mistakenly conclud[e] that
they are getting a 'lot' of guidance" thus diminishing "their personal
moral responsibility for the sentencing decision. " 30
Last, under the guise of fulfilling the Court's requirement of specifying in advance the "worst" murders and murderers, states have
promulgated aggravating factors that collectively cover virtually all
cases.31 Hence, the apparent "guidance" in current schemes falsely suggests to sentencers that "ordinary" murder cases are in fact extraordinary ones. As in the pre-Furman regime, jurors are empowered to return a death verdict in almost any case, but now they are led to believe
that they are in fact reserving the death penalty for a small class of especially deserving offenders.
stance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; then the sentence shall be death.").
28. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1090-93 (1995) (discussing data that
reveals juror misunderstanding of capital sentencing instructions); James Luginbuhl &
Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70
IND. L.J. 1161, 1164-67 (1995) (discussing data suggesting that a substantial number of
jurors in North Carolina did not understand that they could not consider nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances; that they could consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; that they could consider mitigating factors that other jurors' rejected; and that
mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Craig Haney, Taking
Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1229 (1995) (reporting that a majority of
California jurors who had served in capital cases did not understand the concept of
mitigation).
29. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion).
30. Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck? - Juror Misperception of Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1159 (1995).
31. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 373-74.
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One might conclude from these charges against contemporary state
efforts to guide sentencing discretion that Justice Harlan was right to insist that such efforts are doomed to fail. As Professor Robert Weisberg
has argued, "the inevitably unsystematic, irreducibly personal moral elements of the choice to administer the death penalty" 32 render efforts to
guide decisionmaking unhelpful at best and misleading or distorting at
worst. On this view, the question is not whether to rationalize the death
penalty so much as whether to retain it notwithstanding our inability to
control the moment of decision. The debate would thus focus ultimately
on the "significance" rather than the acknowledged "truth" of Justice
Harlan's insight.33
I share the view that Furman's general concerns about arbitrariness
and discrimination cannot be fully met by refining the language in
which the punishment decision is cast.34 My argument here is that current sentencing instructions nonetheless could be improved by focusing
on more narrow, achievable goals and by adopting an approach to capital sentencing that differs significantly from both the pre-Furman and
post-Furman paradigms. The model instructions I propose seek to limit
the class of the death eligible and at the same time seek to communicate
to sentencers in clear terms the nature and scope of their decisionmaking power. In this respect, the instructions seek to correct two central
respective failings of the pre- and post-Furman paradigms. The
"standardless discretion" approach em~odied in the pre-Furman statutes offers no protection to those defendants who are not truly among
the "worst" offenders. The "guided discretion" approach reflected in
contemporary statutes structures the deatli penalty decision in ways that
are unhelpful and misleading, thereby undermining sentencer
accountability.
Though I view these problems of proportionality and accountability as addressable (if not fully correctable), I do not believe that capital
sentencing instructions can meaningfully address a separate and perhaps
overriding concern of Furman: fairness across cases. This conclusion
rests partly on a recognition of the limits of legal language - Justice
Harlan's point about our inability to capture in words the myriad considerations related to the death penalty decision. Equally decisive,
though, is the inherent arbitrariness in any scheme that affords the sentencer wide discretion to consider mitigating factors. 35 Fairness requires
rules and constraints on discretion. Affording sentencers an unaccounta32.
33.
34.
35.

Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REv. 305, 393.
Id. at 313.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 414.
Id. at 389-93.
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ble veto of the death penalty - a veto that can and will be used arbitrarily or discriminatorily in some cases - forecloses any aspiration to
meaningful equality in capital sentencing.36 At the same time, such individualized sentencing is a prerequisite to ensuring that the death penalty
truly is deserved in particular cases. Thus, while individualized sentencing ensures one kind of fairness - proportionality - it undermines
equal application of the law by allowing for unprincipled dispensations
from the death penalty. In short, the general fairness and specific proportionality concerns identified in Furman and subsequent cases cannot
be simultaneously satisfied.
Once this dilemma is fully recognized and embraced, we are left to
choose between instructions that seek to impose significant structure on
the sentencing decision in the quest for systematic fairness and instructions that preserve and highlight the discretionary moral judgment necessary to proportional verdicts. My proposed instructions take the latter
route. This choice is partly informed by my skepticism about the prospects for securing overarching fairness and the contribution that sentencing instructions can make in that regard. But my conclusion rests
primarily on my belief that specific proportionality concerns in any case
trump general fairness concerns: withholding the death penalty in circumstances in which it is not deserved is a more compelling moral goal
than ensuring that the penalty is imposed in every case in which it is
deserved.
The "informed discretion" approach includes the following basic
elements:
a. states would define capital murder narrowly so as to limit the
class of the death eligible during the guilt-innocence phase of capital
trials;
b. states would not enumerate aggravating and mitigating factors at
the punishment phase, and thus would not instruct sentencers to balance
or weigh such factors as the method of reaching their decision;
c. states would instruct sentencers that the defendant's conviction
for the crime of capital murder does not create a presumption that the
death penalty is the appropriate punishment (thus, states would not
frame the ultimate decision in terms of whether the sentencer finds mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for a sentence less
than death);

36. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the
Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE LJ. 835, 862-64 (1992)
(book review).

August 1996]

Capital Decisionmaking

2599

d. states would instruct sentencers that the death penalty, as opposed to oth~r serious punishments such as life imprisonment, is reserved only for those defendants who deserve the penalty and that the
moral judgment of whether death is deserved remains entirely with
them; that the determination whether death is deserved involves consideration <tf any factor that suggests whether the defendant is or is not
among the small· group of "worst" offenders; and that, in deciding
whether the defendant deserves the death penalty, the sentencer is required to consider not only the circumstances surrounding the crime,
but also aspects of the defendant's character, background, and capabilities that bear on his culpability for the crime;
e. states would inform sentencers of ·the full parameters of punishment alternatives to the death penalty, including any information about
the availability of parole or ·clemency for persons sentenced to life
imprisonment.
To make the case for the proposed changes, I will first describe
briefly in Parts I and II the structure of pre- and post-Furman capital
decisiorurtaking and the weaknesses of those approaches. I then will set
forth in Part III the specific rationales for each proposed reform.
The scheme I propose raises a significant constitutional question.
Can the death penalty be retained as a punishment if we abandon the
pretense of providing meaningful guidance through detailed sentencing
instructions? Would the reestablishment .of relatively unstructured penalty phase deliberations similar to, but also importantly different from,
those characteristic of pre-Furman schemes survive post-Furman
scrutiny?
From a purely doctrinal perspective, ~e answer seems relatively
clear, albeit somewhat surprising given the complexity of current state
statutes. Despite the Court's seeming embrace of the structured penalty
'phase as an indispensable feature of constitutional state death penalty
schemes in the 1976 cases,37 current doctrine apparently permits states
to leave the sentencing decision entirely unstructured if death eligibility
is established at the guilt-innocence phase through narrowed definitions
of capital murder. 38 This result follows in part from the Court's rejection
of the proposition that states have an obligation to "channel" sentencer
discretion independent of their obligation to narrow the class of the
death eligible.39 Accordingly, the complicated formulae of contempo37. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 385.
38. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 245-46 (1988) (permitting death eligibility to be established at the.guilt-innocence phase of capital trials).
39. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that Georgia's scheme, in
which the sentencer is not guided in its decisionmaking after identifying at least one
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rary statutes, enacted in response to perceived constitutional constraints,
remain in place as a function of state choice rather than actual federal
fiat.
The Court's flexibility on the procedural side is matched by its unwillingness to subject the outcomes of such procedures to demanding
scrutiny.,Notwithstanding Furman's much discussed concern about arbitrary and discriminatory death sentencing practices, the Court has emphatically rejected the notion that unequal outcomes among groups of
defendants violate the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection
Clause, even when such inequality is based on race. 40
These decisions together suggest that the concern for equality
across cases already has dropped out as a constitutional prerequisite to
the administration of capital punishment. Whether these developments
are viewed as an unfortunate abandonment of the concerns of Furman
and the 1976 cases,41 or as a realistic accommodation of various competing goals in the capital punishment jurisprudence,42 it seems that the
return to relatively unstructured capital sentencing would not run afoul
of current doctrine.

statutory aggravating circumstance, is constitutional as applied to a defendant whose
jury considered an impermissibly vague aggravating circumstance before sentencing
him to death); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984) (reaffirming that once a state has
limited the class of the death eligible "to a small sub-class" of defendants, the state has
no further obligation to ensure equality in sentencing).
40. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the administration of the death penalty in Georgia
based on statistical evidence that revealed disparate treatment of defendants along racial
lines, particularly in light of the race of the victim).
41. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134-35 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("It seems that the decision whether a human being should live or die is so
inherently subjective - rife with all of life's understandings, experiences, prejudices,
and passions - that it inevitably defies the rationality and consistency required by the
Constitution."); Zant, 462 U.S. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Today we learn for
the first time that the Court did not mean what it said in Gregg v. Georgia. We now
learn that the actual decision whether a defendant lives or dies may still be left to the
unfettered discretion of the jury."); Weisberg, supra note 32, at 395 ("In its own
clumsy and often dishonest way, and perhaps for illegitimate reasons, the Supreme
Court seems to have decided that it no longer wants to use constitutional law to foster
legal formulas for regulating moral choice at the penalty trial.").
42. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 ("The Constitution does not require that
a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant
factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment. As
we have stated specifically in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does
not 'plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on its use.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion)).

August 1996]

I.

Capital Decisionmaking

2601

STANDARDLESS DISCRETION: THE THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF FURMAN

The state statutes in force at the time of Furman left the punishment decision in capital cases entirely unstructured. Indeed, most states
did not establish a separate proceeding for assessing punishment and
simply directed capital juries to decide punishment at the same time
that they considered whether the defendant had in fact committed the
crime.43 Illustrative of state statutes was Ohio's instruction exhorting jurors to rely on their "profound judgment" in choosing between death
and some lesser punishment.44 Virtually all states employed similarly
vague phrases that told the jury that the decision was important but not
much else.45 Exacerbating the absence of standards for choosing between death and imprisonment was the range of available punishments
within the jurors' discretion. Georgia's rape statute challenged in
Furman, for example, allowed the jury to choose between death at one
extreme and one year's imprisonment at the other.46
The basic problems with standardless discretion can be grouped
around three related ideas: notice, general fairness, and proportionality.
The notice problem stems from the state's failure to communicate its
underlying theory for choosing the death penalty in some cases and not
others. Despite the state's judgment that death is not appropriate for all
persons convicted of capital crimes - as evidenced by its nonmandatory statute - the state has not specified in advance any of the grounds
for withholding such punishment.
The value of notice usually carries little weight absent a tie to reliance or fairness. In the capital context, a defendant would be hard
pressed to insist that he deserved advance notice about when the death
penalty would be imposed in order to structure his affairs - that is, to
decide the circumstances under which he could commit murder or rape
43. Thirty-four of the 41 states in which juries decided punishment in capital cases
did not bifurcate proceedings at the time McGautha was decided. Weisberg, supra note
32, at 309 & n.14 (citing Project, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in FirstDegree-Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297, 1307 & n.10, 1432-38 (1969)).
44. See State v. Caldwell, 21 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ohio 1939) (providing standard instruction for sentencing in capital cases).
45. See, e.g., Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla.)., cert. denied, 371 U.S.
879 (1962) (Florida instructions made clear that the decision to impose death or a lesser
punishment was to be "determined purely by the dictates of the consciences of the individual jurors"); People v. Bernette, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443 (Ill. 1964) (stating that capital
punishment is "an optional form of punishment which [the jury is] free to select or reject as it [sees] fit"); State v. Mount, 152 A.2d 343, 351 (N.J. 1959) (indicating that the
decision to impose death is at the "absolute discretion of the jury upon its consideration
of all the evidence").
46. See GA. CODE ANN.§ 26-1302 (Supp. 1971).
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without risk of execution. Society certainly has an interest in specifying
in advance its conception of the "worst" murders as a means of deterring precisely those crimes, but a defendant who has general warning
about the availability of severe punishments including death for certain
crimes cannot plausibly claim a strong reliance ground for withholding
the death penalty.47
The more substantial notice claim concerns fairness. If states believe that death is not warranted for all persons convicted of murder or
rape, but nonetheless leave the ultimate determination in the unstructured and unreviewable discretion of particular juries, there is no guarantee that all similarly situated defendants will be treated equally. Different juries will be persuaded by different kinds of evidence and
argument, and the death penalty will presumably tum in large part on
whether a defendant fortuitously finds himself before a jury whose operative "theory" places him on the side of imprisonment rather than
death.
As the petitioner argued in McGautha, the fairness concerns are especially compelling when the death penalty, although available in an
extraordinary number of cases, is imposed rarely. 48 In such circumstances, the community, speaking through particular juries, exempts the
vast majority of persons eligible for the death penalty for a variety of
unspecified reasons. When a defendant does receive the death penalty
in such a scheme, there is no basis for knowing whether it was his case
or his jury that was truly exceptional. Thus, the absence of standards
coupled with the rare imposition of the death penalty raises the possibility that those persons sentenced to death would not merit such punishment according to the values of the wider community. Hence, the imposition of the death penalty in such circumstances would not only be
unfair - in the sense that equally undeserving persons were spared but also disproportionate.
The rarity of executions also could suggest that virtually all executions are disproportionate according to community standards. On this
account, though the death penalty remains on the books, the community
depends on juries to withhold the punishment, and the infrequency with
which death is actually imposed forestalls legislative reform. Hence,

47. See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim by
defendant that he did not have fair notice of death eligibility for murder committed in
the course of attempted rape on the ground that "[i]t would carry legal fiction to offensive lengths to speculate that [the defendant] was inveigled by the Illinois legislature
into killing his victim when he did because he reasonably believed that he could not be
punished for capital felony murder"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994).
48. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203-04 (1971).
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discretionary decisionmaking could actually conceal declining support
of the death penalty in the larger community.49
As discussed above, these concerns regarding the absence of standards as well as the infrequent imposition of the death penalty led the
Court to invalidate existing death penalty schemes in Furman. The
states responded swiftly (eliminating doubts about sufficient legislative
"will" to sustain the death penalty50) and the resulting statutes sought
to provide the structure thought to be necessary to survive the Court's
further scrutiny.
II.

GUIDED DISCRETION IN THE POST-FURMAN WORLD: TELLING
SENTENCERS Too MUCH AND Too LITTLE

A.

The Mechanics of Post-Furman Sentencing

The new statutes passed in the wake of Furman differ in many details but can be roughly grouped as mandatory statutes, factor statutes,
and special issue schemes. The mandatory statutes provide the ultimate
guidance to jurors because they involve no separate consideration of
punishment; rather, the statutes require imposition of the death penalty
for certain crimes. Although some members of the Court seemed to invite this response in their Furman opinions,51 the Court subsequently
ruled that capital defendants are entitled to an "individualized" proceeding in which sentencers consider mitigating evidence offered in
support of a sentence less than death. 52

49. By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court, relying on public-opinion polls, suggested that support for the death penalty was in sharp decline. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) ("Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of
capital punishment - of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty
- such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority.") (citing a 1966
poll in which only 42% of the American public favored capital punishment for convicted murderers).
50. Thirty-five states and the federal government passed new statutes over the next
four years. See Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall
and the Death Penalty, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1131, 1136-37 (1993) (describing the states'
reaction to Furman).
51. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 u:s. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I
find it unnecessary to reach the ultimate question" whether "infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances."); 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J.,
concurring) ("The facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the
death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder,
or for rape would present quite different issues under the Eighth Amendment than are
posed by the cases before us.").
52. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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The two remaining alternatives - factor statutes and special issue
schemes - seek in varying degrees to provide greater structure to deliberations on the issue of punishment through a separate penalty phase
of the trial. Hence, one hallmark of contemporary death penalty law is
the universal establishment of bifurcated proceedings. Bifurcation is
significant for two reasons. First, by removing the issue of punishment
from the guilt-innocence trial, bifurcation avoids putting the defendant
to the difficult choice of denying guilt, on the one hand, and accepting
responsibility and presenting mitigating evidence, on the other. More
importantly, bifurcation communicates to the sentencer that the punishment decision is a serious one that deserves separate, focused attention.
Thus, despite the Court's emphatic rejection of the claim in McGautha
that bifurcation is constitutionally compelled via the Due Process
Clause or as a corollary to the Fifth Amendment's protection against
compelled self-incrimination,53 all states that did not enact mandatory
statutes adopted bifurcated proceedings in the wake of Furman partly as
a means of acknowledging the heightened significance of the death penalty decision.

1. Factor Statutes
The defining feature of most post-Furman statutes is the enumeration of "aggravating" (and in most cases "mitigating") factors to guide
sentencer discretion. These factor statutes require the sentencer to find
the existence of at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance in order to return a sentence of death. In so-called "weighing" states, such
as Mississippi,54 the sentencer is explicitly instructed to weigh or balance aggravating against mitigating factors to reach a sentencing decision.55 In "threshold" states, such as Georgia,56 after the sentencer identifies at least one aggravating factor, the aggravating factors do not play
a specific or defined role in sentencing; rather, the sentencer is thereafter basically unguided in reaching the ultimate verdict.

53. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208-20 (1971) (rejecting the argument that bifurcated capital proceedings are constitutionally compelle,d).
54. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-101 to -107 (1994).
55. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 99-19-101(3) (1994) ("For the jury to impose a sentence
of death, it must unanimously find ... [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.").
56. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) ("Thus, in Georgia, the
finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing
body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty.").
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Despite Supreme Court doctrine to the contrary,57 the "weighing"
and "threshold" approaches are essentially the same.58 They both call
attention to state-endorsed factors that purportedly distinguish especially
blameworthy or dangerous offenders from ordinary ones. More significantly, they both suggest to the sentencer that the ultimate decision can
and should be broken down into component parts. As a result, both
weighing and nonweighing factor approaches run the risk of obscuring
the overarching moral question of desert to which the component parts
are primarily directed.
Factor statutes (whether "weighing" or "threshold") often provide
additional, highly technical instructions regarding the burden of proving
or disproving aggravating or mitigating factors. Alabama, for example,
instructs the sentencer that the defendant is entitled to offer any mitigating circumstance, and further states that "[w]hen the factual existence
of an offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the defendant shall
have the burden of interjecting the issue, but once it is interjected the
state shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that
circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. " 59 In a. similar vein,
North Carolina sets up different burdens for sentencer consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors, holding the former to the "reasonable doubt standard" while requiring the sentencer to find the latter only
by a preponderance of the evidence.60
Many factor statutes establish a presumption in favor of death
upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance. Idaho's statute, for example, provides that " [w ]here the court finds a statutory aggravating
circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the
court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented are

57. Compare Zant, 462 U.S. at 890 (holding that the invalidation of an aggravating circumstance does not require reversal of the death penalty in a nonweighing jurisdiction) with Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990) (holding that some form
of appeIJate reweighing or harmless error analysis is required to save a death verdict after a jury considered an impermissible aggravator in a weighing state).
58. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 386-87 & n.153 (criticizing the purported difference between weighing and nonweighing statutes); Stephen Hornbuckle,
Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law,
73 TEXAS L. REv. 441, 455-57 (1994) ·(same); cf Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 704 (7th
Cir. 1993) (in response to petitioner's assertion that the jury should have been told that
it was to weigh the aggravating against the mitigating factors, the court concluded that
"[i]t is obvious that when one is asked to consider pro and con considerations one is
being asked to compare and thus in a sense weigh them" and that "[b]elaboring the obvious is not a reliable formula for enlightenment"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994).
59. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(g) (1994).
60. NORTH CAROLINA PA'ITERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES
§ 150.10, at 27 (1995).
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sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust. " 61 Other
statutes, notably California's and Pennsylvania's, require the sentencer
to return a death verdict upon a finding of at least one aggravating and
no mitigating circumstances.62 These latter statutes were recently challenged on the ground that, in certain cases, a sentencer might not regard
death as the appropriate punishment notwithstanding the presence of at
least one aggravating and no mitigating factors. 63 The Supreme Court
rejected this claim, though, insisting that states could enact schemes
with some "mandatory" aspects as long as they also permit the consideration of mitigating evidence.64
One important characteristic of the quasi-mandatory schemes
adopted by Pennsylvania and California is shared by all factor statutes
and hence by virtually all statutes currently in force: the sentencer never
is asked directly whether the defendant deserves to die. Nor do such
statutes ask directly whether the defendant should be executed to
achieve some other social goal, such as incapacitation or deterrence. Instead, the states' theories concerning when death should be imposed are
communicated obliquely through the enumeration of certain kinds of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The "ultimate questions" in
such statutes invariably refrain from informing the sentencer of any
overarching penological concerns to which the enumerated circumstances are connected. They either instruct the sentencer to weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors in some fashion or they simply direct the sentencer to reach a decision.
2.

Special Issue Statutes

Until recently, the two special issue statutes enacted in Texas and
Oregon differed significantly from the factor statutes in that they did
not ask the sentencer an "ultimate question" at all. Instead, Texas and
Oregon required the sentencer to answer two and sometimes three special issues relating to the deliberateness of the defendant's conduct, the
probability of the defendant committing violent acts in the future, and
the extent to which the defendant acted in response to perceived provo-

61. IDAHO CODE§ 19-2515(c) (Supp. 1995).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 97ll(c)(iv) (1982).
63. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494
U.S. 299 (1990).
64. See Blystone, 494 U.S. at 303-05.

August 1996]

2607

Capital Decisionmaking

cation.65 If all of the answers to the questions were affirmative, the verdict was death.
In many respects, the special issue schemes seemed to suffer from
the same defect that the Court identified in the mandatory statutes invalidated in 1976: 66 the schemes did not provide a particularly clear or
promising vehicle for sentencer consideration of mitigating circumstances. Nonetheless, the Court provisionally sustained Texas's special
issue scheme against a facial challenge on the hope that the issues
would be construed broadly enough to ensure individualized sentencing.67 Over a decade later, the Court concluded that the Texas statute
was unconstitutional as applied to a defendant with mental retardation
because the special issues did not afford the sentencer adequate opportunity to give mitigating effect to the defendant's limited intellectual capacity.68 Both Texas and Oregon responded to the Court's decision by
adding an additional open-ended special issue that essentially permits
sentencer consideration of any mitigating factors. 69
Accordingly, the special issue schemes today function much like
the factor statutes in the sense that they permit sentencer consideration
of the functional equivalent of aggravating factors as well as any mitigating evidence. In addition, the new special issue in the Texas scheme
mirrors the ultimate question asked in a number of factor statutes:
"Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background,
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. " 7 From a
sheer numerical perspective, the special issue schemes seem to be more
favorable toward capital defendants because they do not enumerate a
laundry list of aggravating circumstances, any one of which would be

°

65. See OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (1987) (current amended version at OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (1995)); TEX. CRIM. PR.oc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West
1981) (current amended version at TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West
Supp. 1996)).
66. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
67. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
68. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989).
69. Texas did so by statute, Act of June 16, 1991, ch. 838, sec. I, art. 37.071(e)(g), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2898, 2899-900 (codified as amended at TEX. CRIM. PR.oc.
CODE ANN. art. 37.071.2(e)-(g) (West Supp. 1996)), whereas Oregon did so by judicial
refonnation of the statute, followed by statutory codification, Act of July 24, 1989, ch.
790, sec. 135b, § 163.150(1)(b)(B)-(c), 1989 Or. Laws 1301, 1327 (codified as amended
at OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(D)-(c)(B) (1995)).
70. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071.2(e) (West Supp. 1996).
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sufficient to support a death sentence. On the other hand, the future
dangerousness question that is the centerpiece of the special issue statutes is facially broad,71 and could reasonably apply to virtually any offender. Indeed, given sentencer concerns about incapacitation, the special issue schemes arguably increase the likelihood of death verdicts by
establishing a presumption that "dangerous" offenders should be executed an~ thus deflecting attention from the question of desert.
B.

The Failings of Post-Furman Sentencing
1.

~chemes

Lack of Meaningful Guidance

One of the more obvious failings of the post-Furman statutes concerns the extent to which they truly "guide" sentencer discretion. The
guidance in such statutes purportedly occurs at two levels. First, the
state's enumeration of aggravating factors or their functional equivalent
seeks to inform the sentencer of the principal considerations calling for
extreme punishment. Second, the state's procedural rules regarding the
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and the manner in
which the verdict should be reached attempt to lend structure and consistency to sentencers' deliberations.
a. Enumeration of Aggravating Factors and Special Issues. The
first form of guidance has been undermined significantly by the
proliferation of vague aggravating factors and special issues that arguably apply to most offenses and offenders. In the wake of Furman, many
states believed that the surest path to compliance was to follow the lead
of the Model Penal Code, 12 which unfortunately had endorsed the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor as a means of isolating the
worst murders and murderers.73 The factor seems implicitly to recognize
that most murders are "heinous, atrocious or cruel" by requiring the
sentencer to find that the crime before them was "especially" so before
triggering death eligibility. But asking a sentencer to separate the "especially" heinous from the "ordinarily" heinous crimes does not guide
the sentencer at all. Nonetheless, though the Court has invalidated some
capital verdicts based on the use of impermissibly vague aggravators,74
it has sustained others where states have adopted purported limiting
71. The future dangerousness issue reads as follows: "whether
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
stitute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CRIM. PR.cc. CODE
37.071.2(b)(l) (West Supp. 1996).
72. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.6(3)(h) (1980).
73. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 387 & n.155.
74. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Godfrey
446 U.S. 420 (1980).

there is a
would conANN. art.

v. Georgia,
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constructions75 or where the facially vague aggravator was not thought
to affect the ultimate decision. 76 As a result, many states have failed to
purge dubious aggravators from their schemes.
Moreover, many states have adopted numerous aggravating circumstances.77 Thus, even in state schemes that rely primarily on objective, nonvague aggravating factors, such as committing murder in the
course of a felony, 78 or killing a police officer,79 the factors collectively
suffer from the same defect as individual factors that are impermissibly
vague. Instead of guiding sentencers toward a particular "theory" of the
worst murders, they seem to indiscriminately describe the circumstances
surrounding most murders. Empirical work reflects this dynamic, as virtually all persons sentenced to death in Georgia before Furman would
have been deemed death eligible under Georgia's post-Furman statute. 80
As Justice Harlan argued in McGautha, this problem may be unavoidable. For states to provide meaningful guidance, they must limit the
considerations surrounding the decision. But in the capital context, such
limits seem artificial, because states· and sentencers fairly regard the
range of relevant considerations to be quite broad. Even the draftsmen
of the Model Penal Code acknowledged that " 'the factors which determine whether the sentence of death is the appropriate penalty in particular cases are too complex to be compressed within the limits of a simple formula.' " 81

75. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993) (sustaining Idaho's use of
the factor focusing on whether the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life"
based on the "limiting construction" that confined the factor to "cold-blooded, pitiless
slayer[s)") (internal quotation marks omitted); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)
(upholding Arizona's use of "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" factor against asapplied challenge).
76. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that the inclusion of
an impermissibly vague aggravator was not constitutional error so long as a separate,
constitutionally valid aggravator remained).
77. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-703(F) (Supp. 1995) (listing 10 aggravating circumstances); Cow. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5) (Supp. 1995) (listing 13 aggravating Circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(5) (Harrison Supp. 1995) (listing 12 aggravating circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (1995) (listing 17
aggravating circumstances).
78. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § ?C:ll-3.c(4)(g) (West 1995) ("The offense was
committed while the defendant was engaged in ... flight after committing or attempting
to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping .... ").
79. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(5)0) (Harrison Supp. 1995); s.c.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
80. See DAVID c. BALDUS ET AL .. EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31 (1990).
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 3 at 71 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)
(quoting ROYAL COMMN. ON CAP. PUNISHMENT, REPORT 174 (1953)), quoted in
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 205 (1971).
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The breadth of relevant sentencing considerations is particularly
apparent on the mitigating side. In response to the Court's decisions
elaborating the requirement of individualized sentencing,82 every state
currently allows unbridled consideration of mitigating factors. Although
most states enumerate a short list of mitigating factors, 83 the list is inevitably expanded by a "catch-all" that allows the defendant to present,
and the sentencer to consider, any additional circumstances that call for
a sentence less than death. 84 Thus, whatever limited guidance is
achieved on the aggravating side is undermined by the ,uncircumscribed
discretion that is constitutionally mandated on the mitigating side.
Accordingly, there is little "guidance" and much "discretion" in
post-Furman sentencing schemes. States simply have not developed refined theories of capital sentencing that would permit any significant
constraint on sentencer decisionmaking. The enumeration of aggravating and mitigating factors might have some heuristic value in delineating the kinds of considerations that are pertinent to the ultimate decision, but they surely do not fulfill the ambitious goal of ensuring that
like cases are treated alike. The net of death eligibility remains remarkably broad, and the enumerated factors tell sentencers remarkably little
about which defendants should and should not receive the ultimate
punishment.
b. Decision Rules in Capital Statutes. States also have sought to
guide sentencer discretion by promulgating various types of decision
82. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (invalidating death sentence based
on the failure of Texas special issue scheme to facilitate consideration of defendant's
mental retardation and history of being abused); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987) (condemning Florida's exclusion of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances from
sentencer consideration); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (reversing death
sentence based on state judge's refusal to assign any mitigating weight to the defendant's turbulent family history and emotional disturbance); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating mandatory death penalty).
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(6)
(Harrison Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3 (Vernon Supp. 1996). The six
states that do not enumerate mitigating circumstances are Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4209(c)(l) (1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990); IDAHO CODE§ 19-2515(c) (Supp. 1995); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10.C (West Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A27A-1 (Supp. 1996); Tux. CRIM. PR.cc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071.2(e) (West Supp.
1996).
84. Some states provide a catch-all. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k)
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 16-11-103(4)(1) (Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 413(g)(8) (1992). Most states, however, before their enumeration of mitigating
circumstances, make clear that the enumerated list is not intended to be exhaustive. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994) ("Mitigating circumstances shall include, but not
be limited to, the following .... "); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-4-605 (Michie 1993) (same);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-l(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (same).
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rules that specify the circumstances under which aggravating and mitigating factors can be considered and the procedure for reaching an ultimate verdict. The apparent goal of such instructions is to ensure that
sentencers approach their decision systematically and with due regard to
the reliability of the facts on which the decision is made.
The "threshold" consideration instructions adopted in several
states are valuable to the extent that they require sentencers to find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 85 Such instructions
contribute to proportional sentencing by demanding a high level of
proof before the defendant crosses the line into death eligibility. On the
other hand, instructions that establish some minimum threshold for the
consideration of mitigating evidence, such as a preponderance of evidence standard,86 do not meaningfully contribute to reliability in
sentencing.
As an initial matter, it is not obvious what it means to "find" the
existence of a mitigating circumstance to a certain level of proof. A
sentencer might read such instructions to refer to the proof regarding
some underlying "fact" such as whether the defendant had been the
victim of abuse or possessed abnormally low intelligence. A sentencer
also might read such instructions, however, to invite an assessment of
whether facts acknowledged to be true actually "mitigated" the crime
to a substantial degree. 81
Under either scenario, the instructions do not contribute to reliability. If the sentencer is only marginally persuaded of the existence of
mitigating facts that, if true, would significantly affect the sentencer's
ultimate decision - for example, that the defendant was not the triggerperson and did not intend to kill in a felony murder case - there is
little purpose served by precluding consideration of those facts. The
85. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 971 l(c)(iii) (1982) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for aggravating circumstances).
86. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iii) (1982) (requiring proof by
a preponderance of the evidence for mitigating circumstances); NORTH CAROLINA
PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES§ 150.10, at 27 (1995) ("The
existence of any mitigating circumstance must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence, that is, the evidence, taken as a whole must satisfy you - not beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply satisfy you - that any mitigating circumstance exists.... A
juror may find that any mitigating circumstance exists by a preponderance of the evidence whether or not that circumstance was found to exist by all the jurors.").
87. A similar ambiguity is not likely to occur on the aggravating side because
sentencers ordinarily do not approach aggravating factors with the same level of skepticism with which they approach mitigating factors. Virtually all sentencers would agree
with - or at least accept - the proposition that murders in the course of a felony, or
murders involving more than one victim, or murders committed while in lawful custody, for example, can be deemed more serious than murders perpetrated without such
circumstances.
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power of mitigating evidence is a function of both the strength of the
factual predicate and the moral significance of those possibly true facts.
Thus, even contested factual predicates should play a role in the sentencing decision if the moral significance of those facts is sufficiently
great. On the other hand, if the instruction is inte!)ded to require the
sentencer to make an initial assessment of the significance of accepted
facts, the instruction is of marginal value. The instruction essentially
asks the sentencer to place no weight on facts that otherwise might be
assigned little weight.
Apart from their limited usefulness, these threshold provisions for
the consideration of mitigating evidence reveal a central conceptual
flaw of the post-Furman statutes. Precluding sentencer consideration of
mitigating evidence that is not established by a preponderance of the
evidence makes sense only if the ultimate verdict rests on a quantitative
rather than a qualitative comparison of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If we care about the sheer number of mitigating circumstances found by the sentencer, we would be more inclined toward requiring some initial threshold of reliability. If, however, the sentencing
decision is ultimately a qualitative judgment about the comparative
strength of various aggravating and mitigating factors, establishing a
threshold requirement for consideration arbitrarily excludes concededly
relevant information.
One of the risks of the post-Furman factor schemes is that they invite precisely the sort of wooden, numerical decisionmaking that threshold consideration requirements seem to presuppose. Indeed, in the
Court's decisions concerning the effect of sentencer consideration of
impermissible aggravating factors on resulting death verdicts, the developing doctrine implicitly acknowledges the special weight sentencers
are likely to place on the raw number of aggravating factors in certain
circumstances. The Court has held that courts in "weighing" states may
not apply "an automatic rule of affirmance" to save a death verdict
when the sentencer considered unconstitutionally vague aggravators because doing so "would not give defendants the individualized treatment
that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances. " 88 This is true despite the fact that
states need not structure sentencing deliberations at all once death eligi-

88. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 754 (1990) (requiring some fonn
of appellate reweighing or hannless error analysis to save a death verdict after the jury
considered an impcnnissible aggravator).
·

Capital Decisionmaking

August 1996]

2613

bility has been established.89 Thus, if a state decides to give more structure to the punishment decision than the Constitution requires, it cannot
use that structure to tip the sca1es toward death with vague factors that
are potentia1ly applicable to every case.
If a state does not explicitly require the sentencer to weigh or ba1ance aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencer's consideration of
an impermissibly vague aggravator does not require reversa1 of a death
sentence.90 The difference in these results makes sense only if one believes that sentencers, when asked directly to ·weigh or balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances, are particularly likely to be influenced by the sheer number of aggravating factors that they find.
Even in "threshold" states, though, sentencers are likely to place
great weight on the factor framework precisely because it is the sole
state-endorsed means of approaching the decision. As recent work has
demonstrated, jurors in capita1 cases are often uncomfortable with deciding whether a defendant lives or dies and, as a consequence, are eager to find state-imposed constraints - even illusory ones - to ground
their decision. 91 Mere "numbers" are thus likely to matter ~o sentencers
in the absence of explicit instructions connecting the enumerated factors
to the overriding mora1 and penological concerns surrounding the punishment decision such as retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence. In
those few states in which sentencers are cautioned not to simply compare factors numerica1ly, the "anti-quantitative" instruction given as a
corrective92 still manages to suggest a greater degree of mathematica1
precision to their decisionmaking process than is warranted. 93
•

2.

Confusion and Illusory Guidance

One essentia1 problem with factor statutes is that they paradoxically make the decision to impose or withhol~ the death penalty both
89. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (sustaining Georgia's scheme which
affords absolute discretion to sentencer after death eligibility is established through a
finding of at least one statutory aggravating· circumstance).
90. 462 U.S. at 889-91.
91. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1142-56 (discussing juror accounts of decisionmaking in capital cases).
92. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL
CASES § 150.10, at 42-43 (1995) ("You should not merely add up the number of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Rather, you must decide from all
the evidence what value to give to each circumstance, and then weigh the aggravating
circumstances, so valued, against the mitigating circumstances, so valued, and finally
determine whether the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.").
93. See infra text accompanying notes 114-23 (discussing the limitations ofiframing the death penalty decision in terms of aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
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harder and easier than it is or should be. The statutes make the decision
harder because they are laden with jargon· and formulae that lay persons
cannot easily understand or apply. At the same time, they give the illusion that the decision can be reduced to a formula that obviates the need
for the exercise of mon)l judgment.
a. Juror Misunderstanding. Recent empirical studies by the Capital
Juror Project confirm the extent to which jurors cannot make sense of
the new, guided discretion statutes.94 For example, a significant number
of jurors who had served in capital cases in North Carolina were later
found not to understand the basic operation of the state statute, including whether they could consider nonstatutory aggravating factors or
mitigating factors, whether mitigating factors had to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, and whether mitigating factors could be considered
if they were not found unanimously. 95 Jurors who served in other states
have likewise demonstrated poor understanding of some crucial aspects
of their instructions, such as whether they were required to impose the
death penalty upon the finding of a particular aggravating circumstance.96 Along the same lines, researchers in California concluded that
jurors as well as lawyers had difficulty defining, much less applying,
the concept of mitigation, a central feature of all state death penalty
schemes.97
Not surprisingly, the claim that jurors do not understand the complexity of current death penalty statutes appears not only in academic
research but in capital punishment case law as well. An Illinois inmate

94. The methodology of the Capital Jury Project is described in Bowers, supra
note 28, at 1077-85. Basically, the Project conducted lengthy in-person interviews with
randomly selected capital jurors who had served on capital juries since 1988. Of course,
the major problem with such a methodology is that there is no guarantee that jurors' understanding of sentencing instructions at the time of the interviews will correspond perfectly to their understanding of the instructions at the time of their deliberations. See
Valerie P. Hans, How Juries Decide Death: The Contributions of the Capital Jury Project, 10 IND. L.J. 1233, 1238 (1995) (stating that "the use of interviews to study miscomprehension of judicial instructions is more problematic" than the use of such interviews to assess jurors understanding of their ultimate responsibility for their verdict).
95. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 28, at 1164-67.
96. See Bowers, supra note 28, at 1090-91 (reporting that over 40% of jurors believed that the law required them to impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that
the defendant's conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved).
97. See Haney, supra note 28, at 1229 (reporting that "less than one-half of our
subjects could provide even a partially correct definition of the term 'mitigation,' almost one-third provided definitions that bordered on being uninterpretable or incoherent, and slightly more than one subject in 10 was still so mystified by the concept that
he or she was unable to venture a guess about its meaning.") (citing Craig Haney &
Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 420-21 (1994)).
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sought federal habeas relief from his death sentence based on a study
purporting to show that the instructions given at his punishment phase
proceeding were not likely to be understood by reasonable jurors.98 In
particular, the petitioner claimed that the instructions did not sufficiently communicate to jurors that they could consider nonstatutory mitigating factors in reaching their decision. 99 The petitioner also argued
that the jury was not given adequate guidance in weighing aggravating
and mitigating factors. As support for his petition, the inmate introduced a study in which persons called for jury duty. were randomly
given a written test to assess their comprehension of the statutory instructions.100 A substantial number of the participants indicated that they
read the instructions to preclude consideration of certain nonstatutory
mitigating factors. 101
Ironically, the thrust of one aspect of the petitioner's claim was
that the jury needed more instruction, not less. Although Judge Posner's
rejection of this argument salvaged the Illinois instructions, his comments point to the limited value of the many statutes that do inform
sentencers of varying burdens of proof and explicitly dirt'.ct sentencers
to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Comparing the additional weighing instruction sought by the petitioner to instructions
seeking greater precision in the "reasonable doubt" charge, Judge Posner insisted, in language recalling Justice Harlan, that "there is a point
at which definition ceases to be enlightening and becomes
confusing." 102
Judge Posner's response to the other aspect of the petitioner's
claim was less convincing. Reversing in part the district court decision, 103 he dismissed the results of the prospective juror survey on the
grounds that the participants did not actually serve on capital juries and
the study did not employ a control group in which "clearer" instructions were tested and compared. 104 It is not at all apparent how sitting
on a capital jury will render confusing sentencing instructions more accessible, especially given that most jurisdictions do not permit the trial
court to offer any elaboration on the meaning of the instructions during
98. See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433
(1994).
.
99. 12 F.3d at 704.
100. 12 F.3d at 705-06.
101. 12 F.3d at 705.
102. 12 F.3d at 704.
103. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1991), 806 F.
Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992), modified, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 433 (1994).
104. See Free, 12 F.3d at 705-06.

2616

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2590

the course of the jury's deliberations. But even granting this methodological flaw, Judge Posner's arguments concerning the absence of a
"control" group are ultimately more telling.
Judge Posner essentially was demanding that the petitioner design
a new, clearer set of _sentencing instructions implementing Illinois's
death penalty scheme in order to prevail. The problem, though, as Judge
Posner acknowledged, is that the Illinois scheme, like most factor statutes, cannot be communicated in terms that ordinary jurors are likely to
understand. According to Judge Posner, "the cause of the complexity of
the instructions may be Illinois's constitutionally sanctioned system for
determining whether to impose the death penalty in a particular case
rather than the articulation of that system in the challenged instructions." 105 In short, Judge Posner recognized that virtually any set of instructions implementing Illinois's scheme would be difficult for laypersons to grasp. 106
If it is true that Illinois's scheme defies comprehensible implementation, it should be no defense that the scheme has been "constitutionally sanctioned" in prior cases - presumably in the 1976 decisions upholding similar factor statutes. Of course, Illinois must have regarded
itself as in a double bind. Forced by Furman to provide guidance to
death penalty decisionmak:ers, it was now challenged precisely for giving guidance that was overly intricate and complex. Judge Posner understandably wants to forestall this catch-22 in which states can be
faulted either for giving too little guidance or too much.
Nonetheless, the Court's insistence on greater guidance should not
be construed as an absolute bar against empirical challenges that reveal
the limited value of the purported guidance. After all, ignoring the fact
that the new statutes confuse juries will not promote equality or consistency in sentencing. As Judge Cudahy argued in dissent, "It would be
ironic but not surprising if the effort to make death sentencing rational
also contributed mightily to confusing the jury." 107 Rather than pretending that the confusion did not exist, "we are better off attempting to
cope with reality than settling for a mere judicial ritual." 108
More importantly, the reluctance to entertain "comprehensibility"
challenges to state schemes would be better justified if current death
penalty doctrine in fact compelled states to enact statutes that cannot be
105. 12 F.3d at 706.
106. See 12 F.3d at 706 ("Suppose that it turned out, as we think it well might ••.
that the failure rate was as high or almost as high when the instructions were reworded

....").

107. 12 F.3d at 708 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
108. 12 F.3d at 708 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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understood by reasonable jurors. As I have argued above, however, the
complexity of state schemes, though undoubtedly a byproduct of the
Court's early decisions, need not be retained to satisfy current constitutional standards. 109 States are under no obligation to "channel" sentencer discretion or to structure sentencer decisionmaking in any significant way as long as their schemes suitably limit the class of death
eligible defendants. 110 Nor will the Court police outcomes to ensure that
like cases are treated alike. 111 Accordingly, states can jettison the obfuscating dressing in current statutes that was adopted priqiarily to give the
illusion that the death penalty decision can be meaningfully tamed by
legal language.
Whether or not the confusion wrought by current statutes rises to
the level of a distinct constitutional claim warranting relief, it surely
should be addressed as a matter of policy. The call for reform is especially compelling given that the major justification for the complexity
of contemporary statutes - promoting equality across cases - is not
significantly advanced under the current regime.
b. Obscuring the Role of Moral Judgment. One signifipant risk perhaps more worrisome than the possibility that jurors will not understand
current death statutes is the possibility that they will. As discussed
above, 112 the defining feature of most contemporary death penalty
schemes is that the ultimate decision of life or death turns on an explicit
or implicit balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors. The hope,
of course, is that the sentencer, tethered to such factors, will have some
principled means of approaching the decision and not stray too far from
morally relevant, permissible considerations.
Framing the death penalty decision in terms of aggravating and
mitigating factors alone, however, with no further instruction about the
larger moral and penological considerations surrounding the decision,
leads to impoverished decisionmaking. Part of the problem stems from
the fact that aggravating and mitigating factors are essentially incommensurate.113 It makes no sense to say in the abstract, for example, that
a certain amount of brutality or harm, on one side of the equation, is
offset by a defendant's limited intelligence or youthfulness, on the

109. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
110. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
112. See supra section II.A.
113. See Weisberg, supra note 32, at 394 (arguing that a central difficulty with
contemporary statutes is that "we cannot devise a mechanical, verifiable process for
'weighting' the values - that is, assigning them valences in the first place") (quoting
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294 (1981)).
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other. Indeed, the most aggravated crimes are likely to be the very ones
in which the defendant has some identifiable limitations which render
him less culpable.
For the comparison of aggravating and mitigating factors to be
meaningful, the decisiol)maker must be informed of the moral question
or questions that the factors are intended to help answer. In contemporary death penalty law, the overriding but not explicitly disclosed focus
of state schemes is desert. Virtually all aggravating factors focus on the
harm caused by the defendant114 while virtually all enumerated mitigating factors focus on aspects of the offender or offense that reduce the
defendant's culpability for the crime. 115 Instead of asking directly
whether the defendant deserves to die, though, state schemes give the
impression that the factors themselves are fully adequate proxies for
that question.
As argued above, 116 one central risk of failing to disclose the ultimate moral question is that the sentencer will place undue weight on
the mere numerical tally of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
without evaluating the moral significance of those factors. It is tempting
for sentencers to believe that all of the moral work in capital sentencing
has been performed by the state in crafting an intricate and detailed sentencing scheme. The explicit or implicit direction to weigh aggravating
and mitigating factors, together with scientific-sounding instructions regarding burdens of proof and the manner in which the weighing is to be
accomplished, suggests strongly that the ultimate death penalty decision
involves mechanical application of rules rather than the exercise of genuine judgment. Moreover, the drive toward mere numbers has a built-in
tilt toward death. State statutes generally enumerate more aggravating
than mitigating factors, and aggravating factors, even objective ones such as murders committed in the course of a separate felony 117 - tend
to have wider applicability than the mitigating circumstances commonly
enumerated in state schemes - such as duress, 118 extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, 119 or belief of moral justification. 120

114. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 36, at 854 (discussing the focus of aggravating circumstances in contemporary state statutes).
I 15. Id. at 848-49 (arguing that '°[a] vast majority of the enumerated mitigating
circumstances are primarily, often exclusively, relevant to a defendant's culpability").
116. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
117. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(l) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995);
WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(iv), (xii) (Supp. 1995).
118. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(g) (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(6)(e) (1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(e)(5) (1982).
119. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-:Sl(2) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18304(2) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2) (West Supp. 1996).
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Mechanical decisionmaking might seem to be desirable. After all,
one of the central critiques of standardless discretion was that states had
not sufficiently constrained sentencer decisionmaking to ensure that
similarly situated offenders receive similar verdicts. The problem,
though, is that notwithstanding the acknowledged goal of consistent
sentencing patterns, the Court has concluded that the Eighth Amendment demands a sustained link between community values and resulting
death verdicts. 121 The intimidating, formalistic character of contemporary statutes threatens to sever that connection by obs<;:uring the moral
role that sentencers are rightly expected to assume.
Worse still, such statutes invite sentencers to abdicate their independent judgment in favor of arbitrarily constructed systems that do not
embody clear or coherent theories concerning the appropriate scope of
the death penalty. Aggravating circumstances that purport to identify a
narrowed category of especially deserving offenders in fact identify virtually the entire class of offenders. 122 Moreover, merely to list aggravating and mitigating factors without specifying in advance the weight to
be accorded different factors is to leave sentencers in exactly the same
"unguided" position as the pre-Furman jury, except with a heightened
and unjustified belief that their decision has been rationalized. As one
commentator recognized even before the Court had entered the constitutional thicket, "to make explicit the set of factors relevant to sentencing
is not sufficient to bring the sentences actually meted out under any
uniform standard at all [and] is wholly insufficient to provide for fairness in jury sentencing, which is precisely what introducing these factors ... is intended to obtain." 123
At least "true" mandatory death penalty statutes requiring imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes reflect defensible - although perhaps undesirable - moral theories. Contemporary statutes,
on the other hand, manage simultaneously to induce a false sense of
constraint while offering little meaningful guidance. Sentencers are alleviated of the responsibility for decisions that in fact reflect no moral
theory at all.
120. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4)0) (Supp. 1995); LA. CODE
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.S(d) (West ·1984); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-20A-6.F (Michie
1994).
121. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(stating that " 'one of the most important functions any jury can perform' in exercising
its discretion to choose 'between life imprisonment and capital punishment' is 'to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system' ") (quoting
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968)).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
123. Bedau, supra note 1, at 220.
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The extent to which post-Furman sentencers seek refuge in the intricacies of statutory instructions is reflected in the preliminary findings
of the Capital Jury Project. 124 When asked where the responsibility for
the death sentence in their case rests, jurors overwhelming indicated
that the "law" rather. than the "jury" or "individual jurors" bore
greater responsibility for the verdict. 125 This empirical finding bolsters a
substantial sociological and legal literature that has predicted just such
an outcome, based on the observation that individuals seek to avoid personal moral responsibility for decisions that will lead tQ the infliction of
pain on others. 126 As Professor Weisberg has eloquently argued, "People escape the dilemma [of painful choices] when the law offers them
the 'choice to be choiceless' through a mechanical formula of decision
cloaked in the rhetoric of professional authority." 121

Ill.

PROPOSED REFORMS

If genuine equality in sentencing cannot be achieved through detailed sentencing instructions - and Justice Harlan could find nothing
but vindication in the post-Furman experiment with guided discretion
schemes - it seems sensible to dispense with the "comforting illusions" 128 offered by the minutely detailed but ultimately minutely effective post-Furman sentencing statutes. The suggestions that follow seek
to restore the moral accountability in capital sentencing that was
wrongly sacrificed in the name of goals that have not and cannot be
achieved by increasing the structure of the sentencing decision. The restoration, though, does not involve a wholesale return to pre-Furman
sentencing. Rather, the proposal seeks to ensure that states truly reserve
124. See Bowers, supra note 28, at 1093-98.
125. Id. at 1094-95 (indicating that jurors, given the choice of five responsible entities for the verdict, stated as follows: defendant was "most" responsible (46.1 %); law
was "most" responsible (34.4%); jury was "most" responsible (8.8%); individual juror
was "most" responsible (6.4%); and judge was "most" responsible (4.5%)).
126. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1157 & n.40 (discussing Robert Cover's illuminating account of the manner in which "even experienced judges in capital cases
must struggle to overcome the natural human reluctance to 'do violence' to another
human being") (citing Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601,
1613-14 (1986)); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 431 (arguing that Cover's claims
concerning the psychological effects of formal legal constructs on the willingness of
judges to do violence might well extend to other actors in the legal system, including
jurors); Weisberg, supra note 32, at 392 (discussing Stanley Milgram's study in which
Milgram concluded that participants' willingness to inflict apparently severe pain was
traceable to the "reassuring professional authority of the scientist ... and the generally
formal atmosphere in which the experiment was conducted") (citing STANLEY Mn.GRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 138-43 (1974)).
127. Weisberg, supra note 32, at 393.
128. See id. at 395.
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the death penalty for a more narrowed class of offenders and that the
ultimate moral decision concerning the defendant's desert is made in a
separate proceeding by sentencers fully informed of the scope and significance of their decisionmaking power.
A.

Narrowing the Class of the Death Eligible at the Guilt-Innocence
Trial and Simplifying Punishment-Phase Instruction

The most damning fact of the decade preceding Furman was the
enormous disparity between death eligibility and the a:ctual imposition
of the death penalty. For a variety of reasons, virtually all death penalty
schemes permitted the death penalty to be assessed for a wide range of
crimes, yet few offenders were sentenced to death and fewer still actually were executed during that period. As discussed above, this gulf between death eligibility and executions fueled claims that the death penalty was administered arbitrarily or, worse, invidiously. 129 Contemporary
statutes have not closed the gap significantly. 130
Unlike the elusive goal of general equality in c;apital sentencing, a
goal that can be frustrated by numerous uncontrolled and uncontrollable
variables, including prosecutorial and sentencer discretion, the concern
that the number of persons eligible for the death penalty reasonably corresponds to the number actually sentenced to death is addressable
through adjustments of state sentencing schemes. 131 To bridge the existing gap, states must refrain from promiscuously enumerating aggravating factors and ensure that the factors - or definitions of capital
murder - ultimately adopted are both objective and genuinely narrowing. Abandoning variants of the "heinousness" aggravating circumstance and the "separate felony" factor will go a long way toward curbing the current overbroad death eligibility in most state schemes. 132
In addition, states should fulfill the narrowing requirement at the
guilt-innocence trial through narrowed definitions of capital murder
rather than at the punishment phase. 133 The central drawback to narrowing at the punishment phase is exactly what prompted states to do so 129. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
130. See Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 412-16
(1994) (comparing the extent of deatli eligibility pre- and post-Furman); Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 19, at 384 (illustrating the breadth of current death penalty schemes,
including California's, which lists 19 categories of death-eligible offenses).
131. The argument for "real narrowing" by state legislatures is defended at
greater length in Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 415-17.
132. See Givelber, supra note 130, at 413 (reporting that 238 out of 246 death eligible cases in New Jersey over an eight-year period included one of these two factors).
133. A number of states, such as Texas and Louisiana, have narrowed their definitions of capital murder at the guilt-innocence phase, but even those narrowed definitions
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it cultivates the impression that the punishment phase has emerged as a
well-regulated, formal trial. The increased formality, though, operates
primarily to obscure the fact that the death penalty decision - and the
ultimate question of desert - is not amenable to rationalization through
legal formulae and rules. The enumeration of aggravating and mitigating factors and the articulation of decision rules concerning the use of
those factors are grand distractions from the more relevant and understandable question of whether the defendant deserves to die. That question, and not the amorphous balancing of various statutory factors, preserves the link between the values of the community and the criminal
process.
B.

Ensuring Consideration of Mitigating Evidence and Facilitating
the Determination of Desert

Stripping the punishment phase of its elaborate dressing will also
reinforce sentencers' responsibility for their verdicts. As in the preFurman era, sentencers will not be able to ignore or escape their role in
deciding whether death should be imposed. At the same time, sentencing instructions should communicate in clearer terms what was often
unsaid or poorly said in the pre-Furman era: that the punishment decision must take account of aspects of the offense and the offender's
character and background that bear on his personal culpability for his
crime.134
One critical shortcoming of some pre-Furman instructions is that
the minimal "guidance" they did offer wrongly suggested that withholding the death penalty could and should be motivated by a desire to
bestow "mercy" rather than a principled determination that death is not
deserved. Contemporary instructions often fare no better in communicating the underlying justification for individualized sentencing. They
ordinarily list certain "mitigating" factors and permit the sentencer to
consider "any other" mitigating circumstances. 135 They do not, howstill manage to cover virtually all intentional homicides. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:30 (West 1986).
134. The proposed instruction would be as follows: "The death penalty, as opposed to other serious punishments sucli as life imprisonment, is reserved only for those
defendants who deserve the penalty and that the moral judgment of whether death is deserved remains entirely with you. The determination whether death is deserved involves
consideration of any factor that suggests whether the defendant is or is not among the
small group of "worst" offenders; and that, in deciding whether the defendant deserves
the death penalty, you are required to consider not only the circumstances surrounding
the crime, but also aspects of the defendant's character, background, and capabilities
that bear on his culpability for the crime."
135. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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ever, articulate a theory of what counts as mitigation, and sentencers
often are left wondering whether certain purportedly mitigating facts are
even relevant to their decision. This problem results in part from the
Court's failure to develop a coherent theory regarding the purpose of individualized sentencing in the many cases recognizing and applying that
principle. 136
The individualization requirement is best read to ensure sentencer
consideration of any evidence relating to the defendant's reduced culpability for his crime. 137 This focus is justified for a vari~ty of historical,
practical, and normative considerations that I have elaborated elsewhere.138 If this culpability focus is accepted, it is imperative that the
focus be communicated to the sentencer in order to ensure that capital
verdicts truly represent an assessment that the defendant deserves death.
Moreover, if desert is recognized to be the foundational inquiry in
capital sentencing, the sentencer must be apprised of the "real" punishment options apart from death. Hence, in jurisdictions that provide for a
life sentence without possibility of parole, the sentencer should be informed of the unavailability of parole -· and conversely, should be informed of the extent of parole eligibility in jurisdictions that make that
option available. Ordinarily, the debate surrounding the decision to inform sentencers about parole eligibility focuses on whether either the
state or the defendant should be permitted to convey accurate information that relates to the need for incapacitation. Substantial arguments exist on both sides of that debate, and the Court recently has recognized a
defendant's right to inform the sentencer about the "real" meaning of a
life sentence in cases in_ which the prosecution builds its punishment
case in part on the defendant's alleged future dangerousness. 139
These debates, however, should be largely moot because accurate
information regarding punishment alternatives, including parole eligibility, is essential to the determination of desert. The decision whether to
impose death is a comparative one, and to make that decision in a principled way, sentencers must be aware of the true severity of alternative
punishments. If the sentencer is left to speculate about the severity of
nondeath options there is a substantial chance that death will be imposed notwithstanding the sentencer's belief that the undisclosed punishment would represent a sufficiently harsh alternative to execution.

136.
137.
138.
139.

See
See
See
See

Steiker & Steiker, supra note 36, at 844-45.
id. at 846.
id.
Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2193-94 (1994).
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CONCLUSION

Over two decades ago, the Court concluded that standardless discretion in capital decisionmaking was inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Since that
time, states have crafted a variety of intricate statutes purporting to enhance the reliability and consistency of capital verdicts. For reasons that
were well anticipated by the opponents of Court-mandated reform, these
new statutes have done little to secure equality in capital sentencing.
Despite the aura of science that surrounds the new provisions, capital
sentencers remain essentially unrestrained in their choice to impose or
withhold the death penalty for virtually any offender who commits
murder.
Perhaps less anticipated than the difficulties of rationalizing the
death penalty decision were the costs of attempting to do so. Instead of
clarifying and distilling the relevant issues in capital cases, the jargon
and complexity that pervade contemporary punishment-phase instructions obscure the fundamental moral role that capital sentencers should
be expected to assume. By distracting sentencers from the unavoidable
and irreducible question of desert, the contemporary effort to tame the
death penalty decision has proven not merely unachievable but counterproductive as well.
Notwithstanding the Court's oft-repeated condemnation of standardless discretion in its post-Furman decisions, current doctrine requires
extraordinarily modest structuring of the death penalty decision. States
can, for example, fully satisfy the "guidance" requirement by narrowing their definitions of capital murder at the guilt-innocence phase and
posing one question at the punishment phase: should the defendant live
or die. Given this somewhat surprising evolution - or devolution - of
the doctrine, the complexity of contemporary statutes, though no doubt
attributable to Court decisions, remains in place largely as a matter of
state choice rather than federal compulsion.
The ultimate question, then, is not whether revamping sentencing
instructions in the manner I propose is constitutionally permissible, but
rather whether such revision is normatively desirable. I argue that it is,
partly because so little is achieved in terms of actual guidance under
current statutory schemes, and partly because the appearance of guidance undermines important goals in capital sentencing that should not
be sacrificed for the sake of appearances.

